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Justus Hunter aims to reframe the debate surrounding the question: “If Adam had not sinned, would 
the Son have become incarnate?” (xiii). The current debate, as H. presents it, is between Thomists 
and Scotists, with Thomists answering the question negatively and Scotists answering positively. 
By presenting the historical sequence of positions and arguments on the question from the twelfth 
to the fourteenth century, H. claims to show “that the responses given by Thomas and Scotus are 
substantially reconcilable” (xiv). 
The first and last chap.s of the book present systematic arguments to develop both the 
question and its possible answers. The first chap. articulates the three forms that the question can 
take (14). The form that gives H.’s book its title is the hypothetical question: “If humanity had not 
sinned, would God have become incarnate?” H. calls the second form the primacy question: “What 
is the primary reason for the incarnation?” This question of primacy has an effect on the 
hypothetical question: If the primary reason for the incarnation is to remedy the effects of sin, then 
a sinless world would have less need of it. H. calls the third and final form the general question: 
“How can we determine reasons for divine operations ad extra?” The answer to this third question 
determines the kind of answer one can give to the first two questions, because the incarnation is 
one of these “divine operations ad extra.” The middle four chap.s present the systematic arguments 
of the first and last chap.s in a historical sequence, beginning with Anselm in the twelfth century 
and ending with Scotus on the cusp of the fourteenth. Although Anselm does not address the 
hypothetical question (35), he receives an entire chap. of his own because he makes deductive 
arguments about what God can and cannot do in creating things. The second of the four historical 
chap.s is devoted to Robert Grosseteste, who uses these deductive arguments to answer the 
hypothetical question (72). The third and fourth of the historical chap.s examine the respective 
Dominican and Franciscan contributions to the thirteenth-century debates over the question at the 
Univ. of Paris. The final chap. of H.’s book reframes this historical sequence of moments as a set of 
systematic arguments that can be understood independently of the historical progression. 
H.’s introduction claims that the central chap.s of the book present the debates over the 
motive for the incarnation in a sequence of three historical moments (xiv). In the first moment, 
“theologians supplied deductive arguments for the conclusion that the Son would become incarnate 
in any possible world.” In the second moment, theologians “rejected the deductive arguments of the 
first moment in order to secure God’s freedom over creation.” In the third and final moment, 




theologians “preserve divine freedom, but also appropriate the arguments of the first moment as 
arguments from congruity or fittingness.” That is, for theologians of this third moment, one can 
prove that the incarnation is fitting, but not that it is necessary. As it turns out, H. does not give 
equal weight to each of these three moments. More than half of the historical chap.s that form the 
center of the book are devoted to the first moment. That is, more than half of H.’s narrative concerns 
the theologians who either supply or support deductive arguments for the incarnation. Chap. Two, 
on Anselm, provides the support for such deductive arguments. Chap. Three presents Grosseteste 
making such arguments himself. And the first half of Chap. Five presents the Franciscans who draw 
on Grosseteste and Anselm’s arguments in a slightly different context. This leaves only a chapter-
and-a-half for the remaining two moments. The first half of Chap. Four (and a few pages in Chap. 
Five for Odo Rigaud) contains the second moment, and the third moment is covered in the second 
half of Chap. Four and the second half of Chap. Five. The structure of the book, then, suggests a 
different theme than the one H. explicitly articulates. Instead of three moments, we have two: 
theologians who make deductive arguments for the incarnation and theologians who do not. H. can 
claim that Scotus and Aquinas are reconcilable because they both fall into the latter camp. 
Certain critical statements throughout the book reinforce this sense that there are two 
moments at stake, not three. A short section entitled “Questioning Hypotheticals”, which proves 
critical for understanding the movement of the book as a whole, casts doubt on the deductive 
arguments of Anselm and Grosseteste. H. begins this section by noting that “history has not been 
kind to the hypothetical question and responses of Grosseteste and others” (101). Namely, later 
thinkers, including contemporary writers, worry that speculating about what God would do in non-
factual situations is an indication of pride. H. characterizes the problem as “the tendency of 
theologians, in response to the hypothetical question, to formulate assertions concerning the divine 
will and intentions that arrive at certainty” (102–103). H. provides several ways of avoiding this 
problem, drawing on the work of Juniper Carol and Dominic Unger. And H. himself provides a 
“cautious” reading of Grosseteste that avoids the problems of a “confident” reading. But this cautious 
reading of Grosseteste does not win out. The final paragraph of the book states that “the 
Grossetestean arguments should be put to rest,” while “the debates that have emerged between the 
Thomists and Scotists [...] should continue to flourish” (231). This nicely summarizes H.’s approach 
to the history he has described, as a critique of attempts to say what God must do, in favor of 
attempts to say what is fitting for God to do. 
As a work of history, H.’s book makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of 
the debates on the reason for the incarnation in the Western Europe of the High Middle Ages. As a 
work of contemporary systematic theology, it is an important response to previous work on the 
question of the incarnation by Edwin Chr. van Driel and Marilyn McCord Adams, both discussed 
briefly by H. (23–26). The density of the later chap.s may overwhelm the non-specialist, but the early 
chap.s are accessible and appear tailored for the non-specialist. Technical terms such as 
“compossible” are carefully defined and illustrated with examples (16–17). The book loses some of 
its accessibility in the historical chap.s, as when H. introduces Peter Abelard without a first name or 
explanation of who he was or when he lived (115). And the non-specialist’s eyes may glaze over 
when reading statements like “Bonaventure gives five reasons in support of his claim,” or clauses 
that begin with “the nine arguments he supplies against this position” (184). But small gems of 
careful definition may be still found here and there in the historical sections, such as H.’s elegant 




division of “fitness” into three kinds in Anselm, along with a few cogent references to secondary 
sources (56-68). H.’s concern to define fitness is not incidental to his larger project. The entire book 
may be most usefully read as a study of arguments from necessity versus arguments from fitness, as 
applied to the specific example of the reason for the incarnation. 
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